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STATISTICAL CONFIDENTIALiTY: SOME THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS TO DATA DISSEM I NATION
1. P. FELLEGI AND J. L.PHilliPS
Potential disclosure has been a problemwith cross-tabulations. With computers, both the problems and
potential uses are multiplied. This paper indicates how to eliminate the possibility of direct and res;dual
disclosure without limiting a statistical agency's dissemination capability. This price paid for the ,nas
produced fley.ibility is a loss of some reliability for very small frequencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistical offices traditionally carefully scrutinize their publications to insure that
there is no disclosure. i.e.. disclosure of information about individual respondents.
This task has never been easy or straightforward. Yet, in the past the technical
limitations of available tabulating equipment put a rather low ceiling over the
number of tabulation cells that could economically be compiled from any single
survey: moreover, these were preplanned tabulations, which typically repeated
themselves from survey to survey. Under these circumstances the problem of
scrutinizing the tabulations. prior to their release. for potential disclosure was
more manageable.
Computers have now become such powerful tools in the hands of both users
and producers of data that the dimensions (though not the substance) of the con-
fidentiality problem have been transformed. Computers, by enabling users to apply
analytical and decision-assisting techniques to a variety of statistical information,
typically in highly disaggregated form, have stimulated an increasing demand for
detailed information which is often of an ad hoc nature rather than pre-planned.
Similarly, the increasing role of governments at all levels puts additional demands
on statistical agencies for data to support their administrative, regulatory, policy-
making, judical and planning activities. Computers have also provided statistical
agencies with a tool for processing, storing and retrieving information from a
variety of separate or linked files, possibly collected over long periods of time.
Thus computers have altered the statistical "market" on both sides: on the side
of thepurchaser" as well as on the side of the "producer."
The statistical "market" situation, however, has a third dimension as well:
the needs and concerns of the general public. The public benefits indirectly from
the legitimate uses ofstatistics by governments, businesses, nonprofit organizations,
academic users, etc.'et, the public is also concerned about the increasing burden
of providing the required statistics and about the real or imagined possibility
of the misuse of the data provided by them. The explosive increase in the demands
for more statistics can only be met, without impossible response burdens being
put on the public, through a more effective exploitation of the data. This increases
geometrically the magnitude of the problem of checking tabulations for disclosure.
It will not be possible to continue very long with the manual methods of checking;
the development of mass production techniques cannot be put off. This is necessary
not only because of the legal requirement but also because statistical offices must
399make the concern of the public their own the real foun(Ia(jon ofreliable Stat i'iics
is public cooperation, not the threat of prosecution under a Stttitic5Act
This paper, the first half of which is based on an article byone of the authors
(Fellegi. 1972), discusses the nature of the disclosure problem,provides anecessary and sufficient condition for residual (or indircct)disclosureto occur andconcludes by the discussion ofan approach which can he appliedon a mass productionscale and which eliminates the possibility of both direct and residualdisc1osur without limiting (lie statistical agency's dissemination capability.The price to bepaid for
the mass produced flexibility is a loss of some reliabilityfor ver smallfrequeicies
2. DIRECT AN!) RESIDUAL DISCJOStJRf:DrFiNITIONS AND Tis-rs
2. IConsiderations Concerning a PossibleJ)efinjmu,n of Ifla(/U('I'l(',lt Dir'ctDicclost,r
Inadvertent direct disclosure, or i.d.d. forshort, involves makingavailable information concerninga unique and identifiable individual. Thestatistical office, of course, never discloses informationabout an individual who isidentified by his name. But the concept of disclosure also impliesrestrictions on disclosureof information on an individual whocan be identified through hischaracteristics. In this latter case. therefore, disclosureoccurs when a user can identifya respondent by recognizing him through hisCharacteristics and learningsomething about him. From this point of view violationof confidentiality might bedefined as the dis- closure of information thatgoes beyond that required for identificationalone. In the case of a tabulation ofcounts(freq uencies) froma census one may argue, therefore, that a table in whichsome of the cells contain entries ofone, but in which none of the marginaltotals are ones, doesnot represent a violation of
confidentiality. In fact, in thiscase a particular entry ofone in a table can only be recognized as referring toa unique identifiable person if thereader knows a priori that the particularperson has all the characteristicsindicated by the table. How- ever, should another dimension ofbreakdown be superimposedon the table, then disclosure would clearlyoccur: at that point, information isdisclosed about a person which goes beyond thatrequired for his unique identification.In a sense at that point the readermay learn somethingnew about the particular person.
To illustrate byan example, Suppose thata census table published fora given municipality is as follows.
TABLE I
o PEKSOSBY INDtLSTRy AN!)OCCUPA1iON
MUNICIPAlITy ,V





400Suppose that the entry of I in row]. column i refers to the syntheic textile
industry, occupation statistician. The reader may recognize the person to whom
the entry of one refershe may say, "IncSmithis astatistician working in a syn-
thetic axtiIe mill the table shows that there is one such person that entry must
therefore refer to Joe Smith." For the reader to recognize this entry as referring
to Joe Smith, he must know in advance both that Joe Smith is a statistician arid that
he works in a synthetic textile mill.
Since in this example none of the marginal totals are equal to one, neither the
industry nor the occupation identifies Joe Smith by itself: both are needed simply
for identification. if this table, however, is extended to a cross-classification of
industry by occupation by age, at that point the reader may learn Joe Smith's age.
FABLE 2




<2020 29303940 4950 5960 --Tota'
Clearly, Table 2 discloses Joe Smith's age group: he is between 30 and 39
years of age.
1.d.d. in the case of count (frequency) tables based on a census could therefore
be defined as an entry of one in a table, provided that at least one of the corre-
sponding possible marginal totals is also one. Given such a precise definition of
i.d.d. (or one similar to it) checking for it can relatively easily be automated.
This argument, of course, does not stand or fall on whether or not the definition
is in terms ofan entry of one. It may be argued that if there are two statisticians in
the synthetic textile industry, the age distribution would disclose to the other
statistician the age of Joe Smith. The definition may be extended and slightly
generalized to read: i.d.d. occurs when in an n-dimensional cross-tabulation of
counts one of the possible marginal totals (in the dimension nI) is equal to a
specified number (presumably one. two, or at most three).
in the case of tabulations based on sample data, the condition stated above
may be relaxed. No i.d.d. occurs so long as two conditions are satisfied : theidentity
of respondents in the sample is held confidential and all tabulation cells are such
that the corresponding population values are greater than one (or some other
specified number). Of these two conditions the first one seems to be very important;
the second is probably automatically satisfied since only very detailed tables
would violate it and these would not be disseminated anyway due to the sampling
errors involved.
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0 0 I 0 0 0 1
Total 0 2 3 0 0 0Finally, in the case of tabulated quantities (in contrawith Counts)One ma
arrive at appropriate translations of the guidelines indicad above if OneaSSumeS that at least the order of magnitude of the individual quantitiesinvolved may be
known to the readera priori.For example, if in a tabulation of industryby occupa
tion the total income earned is tabulated instead of thenumber of persons,it is probable that a well-informed reader may know the orderof magnitude ofthe
average income in each cell so that he may he able to deduce thenumber of people
involved from the total income that is reported (atany rate, he might even beable to obtain from the statistical office a separate tabulation showingthe correspond.
ing number of people). In this case i.d.d.occurs as soon as identification ispossible Hence in our previous example of the industry byoccupation table, if totalincome earned is tabulated rather than the number ofpersons, then the entry in thecell corresponding to the syr(thetic textile industry andstatistician occupationwould disclose Joe Smith's income: the definition ofthe cell identifies JoeSmith, the entry in the cell discloses his income.
The operationally important point isto stop further cross-classificationsjust prior to any individualresponse becoming identifiable in a tabulationcell. ldentj liability in the case of tabulatedaggregates. of course, may dependon consider
tions other than the number of observationsin the cell. Even wherea cell involves
several observations, a uniquely largereported quantity (e.g.. income)may be identifiable. In such cases definitions ofidentifiability other than thosebased on the number of observations alonemust be adopted. e.g., that no singleresponse in a tabulated aggregatemay account for more than a specifiedpercent of the total.
A special type of indirectdisclosure is worth at leastmentioning; the so- callednL'gath'e disclosure.Negative disclosure occurs whena tabulated zero for a
well-defined population in effect disclosesthat no one in the populationhas the
particular characteristic, It onlytakes a moment of reflectionto realize that, for
example, if a tabulation showing thenumber of persons by incomegroup indicates that there are nopersons in a given area earning over 4O,0OOper annum, then this
tabulation in effect discloses aboutevery individual in the givenarea that his income is below S40,000. Althoughfrom a purely legalsense such a disclosure would probably not beprosecutable, from a strictly substantivepoint of view it is disclosure nonetheless:information is provided, althoughindirectly, about identifiable individualrespondents.
2.2. CIieckingJr ResidualDisclosure (Counts or Aggregates)
Residual disclosureoccurs when two or more sets ofpublished data, taken together, enable the userto identify information pertainingto an individual re- spondent even thoughnone of the published data, by itself,is a direct disclosure. Given an unambiguousdefinition of inadvertent directdisclosure exists, a precise treatment of theproblem of residual disclosureis feasible (equally valid whether counts oraggregates are tabulated) In fact, ina previous paper (Fellegi. 1972) a precise mathematicaltreatment was provided dealing withthe problem of detecting residual disclosure.In that papera theorem is stated and proved which provides a necessary andsufficient condition for residualdisclosure to occur. The condition is expressed interms of the rank ofa matrix whosesmallerdimension is
402
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equal to the number of published cells derived from the given survey database.
Clearly the calculation of the rank of a matrix as large as the oneimplied by
the previous paragraph represents a potentially large amount of computation. par-
ticularly if the number of retrieved tabulatioii cells is large. This is, however, a
consequence of the nature of the problem ratherthan of the complexity of the
theorem. In fact, since the theorem provides a necessary and sullicicritcondition
for residual disclosure to occur, the procedures implied by the theorem arelogically
equivalent to any other set of test procedures. With a modest andpredetermined
publication plan, particularly if the publication cells correspond to generally non-
overlapping sets of respondents testing for residual disclosure is feasible.
Even where testing for residual disclosure is feasible. we are leftwith the
problem: when we discover that a tabulation. taken together with allpreviously
published tabulations, is a disclosure, what should we do'? The optionswhich are
available are explored in the next section.
3. A FLEXIBLE 1)ATA DISSEMINATION PRO;RAM WFIICIIOvIRcoMrs
THEPRoisusl 01: DiscLosuRe
3.1 ST4 TP4K: a Flexible Retrieiol and Tabulation Program
As part of the general strategy of dissemination of the 1971 Census data, a
very flexible retrieval system was designed. This system. called theGeographically
Referenced Data Storage and Retrieval System (GRDSR) is describedin more
detail elsewhere (Fellegi and Goldberg. 1969 and Statistics Canada. 1972). The sys-
tem is a complex one which assigns geographic coordinates to allhouseholds in the
Census and then enables us to tabulate data for any special area that a user wants to
identify by outlining its boundaries on a map or by other means. One of the modules
of the GRDSR system is called STATPAK. which is a general tabulation program
that can, in fact, he used whether or not the data base is geographicallycoded.
Thus STATPAK is a data retrieval package which produces cross classified
tables for arbitrary areas. It produces frequency counts, and sums ofquantitative data
(such as income) for an specified breakdown (up to ten dimensions).Options exist
for the computation of subtotals. totals. averages, percentages and in general forthe
tabulation of functions, counts or sums at the row, column,hyper-plane. etc. level.
In the face of the technical flexibility of STATPAKand the substantive
flexibility adopted as the official policy of Statistics Canada inrelation to the
1971 data dissemination program. the question of disclosurebecame an issue of
paramount importance. Clearly, testing for residualdisclosure along the lines of
Section 2 is computationally impossible. But dealing even withinadvertent direct
disclosure on a mass production scale would he quite a task. Someof the alternu-
tive methods which were considered are outlined belo.
3.2.Alternatiee MethodsofDealing with Disclosure
(a) Suppression
Superficially, preventing disclosure would appear to be quite simple: sup-
pressing those numbers which would represent direct disclosure.Unfortunately,
403
-tsubtotals and totals can often beused to "till in the blanks'' Suppressingentire tables containing disclosUreisnot a pleasant possibility.Neither of thescprevents residual disclosure.
(h) Grouping
The entries in rows, Columns,hypeNplanes, etc.. could heaggregatecj (grouped) together with adjacentrows. columns, etc.. until thenumbers become largeenough to print. The main problems hereare the possible loss ofmeaningful (lata (i.e.,the loss of separate break-outsof data which could beshown but whichhave to be grouped together with other datato prevent the disclosureof the otherdata), difficult computerimplementation possibleadditional burdenon the user who might have to supplyconstraints to avoidundesirable groupingsand most importantly no protection againstresidual disclosure.
Ic) Rounding
All numbers could berounded up or downto some multiple ofa base number in the usual way. Intests with census data, thismethod produced biasedc ;tirnates in the sense that. sincea disproportiofthtc numberof tabulation cellsinvoked small last digits, therounding was more oftena rounding down thana r3uflding up. It is also easy to showthat rounding doesnot necessarilyprevent residual disclosure. It' Table 3 belowis known to havebeen obtained byfounding each entry (including totals)to multiples of fiveor zero, it is easy todeduce that the underlying unroundednumbers are those shown inTable 4. Thereason why Table 4 can immediatelyhe deduced fromTable 3 is thecompletely predictablenature of rounding.
TABLE 3
A HYPOTHITICAI TAIUEIWuicitEVIRY







lolal 4 2 6
(dlRandom rounding
GJCn the factthat ordinaryrounding hasa tendency to result iii biased estimates and gienthat due to itspredictability it doesnot always prevent dis- closure, it Seemedlike a natural ideato introducerandoinjzit ion into therounding process, Given a"ounding baseb, such thatevery number is roundedto its multiples. and ifr is theremainder ofa numberwhen divided by h,an unbiased random round- ing procedurecould be definedas follows:
round up withprobabilit) equalto rb (0< rh) round dcwn withprobability equaltoI - rh (0Kr<hI do notround if r = 0.
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Total 5 0 5
TABLE 4
LNRO(JNDFI)flY!'TIIETICAI IARIU
IJNI)ERLYIN(; TAR1E 3It is easy to show that this procedure is unbiased in the sense that the expected
value of any number so rounded is equal to its original unrounded value.It
follows that this is also true for the sum of randomly rounded numbers.
The choice of a base for random rounding is obviously critical. The larger the
base, the larger the variance will be due to random rounding. On the other hand a
small base, such as 2 or 3. does not introduce enough uncertainty to effectively
prevent disclosure. The detailed considerations relating to the choice of an appro-
priate rounding base go beyond the scope of the present paper: they are ex-
tensively discussed by Nargundkar and Saveland in an unpublished paper whose
summary is listed as a reference (Nargundkar. Saveland; 1972). For purposes of
the present paper we just mention that the rounding base for the 1971 Census
data dissemination program was chosen to be 5. This is a large enough base to
effectively prevent disclosure and at the same time its effect on data reliability is
acceptably small (except for very small numbers). It also has the advantage that
in a publication its effect is immediately visible since every number ends in a digit
of 0 or 5.
Someofthe advantagesofthe randoni rounding techniques are:
It is easy to understand and is intuitively appealing.
The expected value ofevery rounded count is equal to the original count:
that is, the rounded count is an unbiased estimator of the original count.
This property is particularly important if the rounded numbers are used
to produce other statistics.
Direct, residual and negative disclosure are all prevented. For example.
with base 5. a tabulated zero may now represent any number between
0 and 4, a 5 may represent any number between I and 9, etc.
The error introduced by random rounding using a small rounding base
has minimal effect on the data.
Computer implementation is simple.
As a matter of official policy, all publications, summary tapes and user-
requested special tabulations from the 1971 Population Census of Canada are
subject to random rounding.
3.3. The Impletnenta11011of Random Rounding in STA TPiI K
While the random rounding technique is straightforward and easy to apply. a
few additional requirements make it impossible to simply random round every
printed number individually. Someofthe considerations in the design are outlined
here:
I. Averages should be maintained.
For example,ifthe original tables showed 3 individuals earning a total of
S33,003.00, thus an average of SI1,00l.00 each, we do not want to random round
these figures separately. giving, for example. 5 persons earning S33,000.0O. an
average of 6,600 each. Rather we would like to show either 5 persons earning
S55,005 or 0 persons earning S0.00.
2. The rounding error of totals and subtotals should he minimized.
405Suppose, totalling and subtotalling would he done followingrandom rotitid.
ing. We might. for example, have had the following unroundedtable
I I
I -
7 II 22 57




But as can be seen, because by chancewe rounded down more often thanup, the TOTAL value contains the accumulatederror and the rounded total isoutside the range we want. In order to minimize the roundingerror of totals and subtotalsthe' are first accumulated, then all tabulation cells inthe resulting tablesare indepen.. dently rounded, including the totals. Inthe example above. 57 wouldbe rounded to either 55 or 60. Thus, in orderto minimize the roundingerror of totals and sub- totals we have to sacrilIce thereassuring feature that the "totalsaddtip"This will be true now only by chance.As will be seen later, the effectof this on tables involving small counts(frequencjes)can he startling, at least untilone gets used to it.
3. Percentages shouldnot "give the game away." Thisapplies also to func- tions of rows, columns,hyper-planes, etc.
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0 59.000If we published the unrounded Table 7 of percentages,together with Tables 8
and 9, on the basis of a minimal understanding of themechanics of random round-
ing it wouhi he ohviouc that the unrounded counts musthave been 4 and 1. Now
using Table 9, the unrounded Table 6 of incomes canbe obtained.
To avoid such problems, all percentages, and otherfunctions (except averages)
of rows, columns, etc. are computed after randomrounding of the count arid sum
tables.
4. The result of repeated random rounding ofthe same table should be the
same.
This avoids the undesirable nuisance of gettingdifferent answers on reruns.
It also provides some deterrent to attempts toobtain an arbitrarily close approxi-
mation of the unrounded value by repeatedly retrievingthe same table and com-
puting the sample mean.
To satisfy these objectives the following basicprocedure is followed
Retrieve data and accumulate the requiredtable of frequencies called the
count matrix (in the case of weightedfiles, the count matrix is the sum of the
weights)and any sum matrices required (including thoseneeded to compute
averages, percentages, etc.).
Compute any totals or subtotals required.
Divide the elements of each sum matrix by thecorresponding elements in
the count matrix to obtain averages.
Random round each element in the countmatrix. The first non-zero
number in the count matrix is used as a startingnumber for a random
number generator.
Multiply the temporary average natrices(from step 3) by the rounded
count matrix to give rounded summatrices.
Compute ratios, percentages, averages, etc.using the rounded count and
sum matrices.
Do traditional rounding to producefigures rounded to the number of
decimal places the user has specified;print the matrices.
3.4. The Impact of RandomRounding
Understanding the random roundingprocedure is no challenge. Accepting
some of the tables asvalid products of this procedure is moredifficult. Tables whose
related count matrix contains verysmall numbers can be severelydistorted.
Looking at some tables (even with acomplete theoretical understandingof the
random rounding implementation) canproduce a "what happened?" reaction.
The following are some examplesof random rounding. Consider Table 10
which is unrounded. A hypotheticalrandom rounding of Table 10 is shown inTable
Ii. Note that in Table lithe subtotalhappened to be rounded up while the total
happened to be rounded down, with theresult that the subtotal is 200 percentof
the total. As can be seen, very smallcounts rounded can produce uselessresults.
With even moderately large counts thedistortion is minimal. For example, con-
sider Tables 12 and 13. The second tableis a rounded version of the first where, asit
happened, the worst possible randomrounding occurred in that both the subtotal
407TABLE tO
HyPorFti t(AL UNROUNOJi!) TABUIAI ION (IFI N(O.MF (IV A(I (iRotI(Ilk A SMAI I.
I'cICeIIIage\ Sum A verage
Percentages Count on Count (Income) (Income) on (lncomcj Age 11-20
Age 21-30 6 RIO 13,800 2,300 Age 3L-40 -
Subtotal 6 100 13,800 2,300 100
All Other Ages -- -
Total 6 tOO 13,8(X) 2,300
TABLE It
HYPO1IIITICAI. RANDOMROUNI)FI) TABULATIONOF INCOSIF BY AGFGROUPS FORA SSIAIL Sun- POI'ULAl (ON
Percentages Sum Average Percentages Count on Count (Income) (Income) on (Inconic) Age 11-20 - --
- Age 21-30 5 tOO 11,500 2,300 104)
Age 31-40 --- --- -- Subtotal 10 200 23,000 2,300 200
All Other Ages-
. -
Total 5 100 11,500 2,300 tOO
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and total havebeen roundeddown while therest of thecounts were roundedup. Clearly for mostuses, Tables 12 and13 are identical. In ponderingthe impact ofrandom rounding,one has to keep inmind that it is themean squarederror of the finalnumbers thatmatters, not theerror associated witha particular operation.
Estimates basedon small numbers(even from a census)usually haverelatively largeerrors associated withthem due to response, sampling,processing andother errors. Onthe basis ofmore detailed studies (Nargundkarand Saveland,1972), the increasein themean squarederror
of censusestimates dueto randomrounding isnegligible forestimates basedon moderately largefrequencies (10-15persons or more).
TABLE 12








on (Income) Age 11-20
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All Other Ages 398 44 1,990,000 5,000 57 Total 899 100
4.269.4)00 4.749 tOOTABLE 13
Flrt'oriIt;TIcAI RANUOM RotiNuro TAIUJIAFI0N OF INCOME liv AGE GROUPS
Pecentages Sum Average Percentages
Count on Count linconie) (Income) or. (Income)
Age 11-20 20 2 20,000 1,000 0
Age 21 30 325 36 1,300,000 4,000 31
Age 31-40 165 18 990.000 6,000 23
Subtotal 500 56 2,274,500 4,549 54
All Other Ages 400 44 2,1300,000 5,000 57
Total 895 100 4,250,355 4,749 100
CoNcLusioN
The implementation of randomrounding in STATPAK provides adequate
safeguarding of confidential data. Verysmall numbers are relatively severely
distorted. This provides good protectionagainst both direct and indirect (residual
as well as negative)disclosure. Thus, when designing aSTATPAK tabulation,
care should be taken tospecify a breakdown in keeping with thenumber of data
units being retrieved. At any rate, theincreased mean squared error (veryslight
for counts exceeding, say, 10) is aprice that has to be paid for the almostunlimited
retrieval and tabulation flexibility which aretrieval program like STATPAK can
provide.
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